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Executive Summary


Florida International University’s Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy (JGI) and the
Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center (LACC), with support from United
States Southern Command, conducted a study to understand Colombian perceptions towards
internal and external actors and Colombia’s pursuit of peace. The study revolved around the
analysis of 14 focus groups conducted in seven Colombian cities.



In general, focus group participants had high levels of trust in the U.S. government and the
U.S. military, largely as a result of the security gains experienced through U.S. assistance to
Colombia. Participants viewed U.S.-Colombian military-to-military cooperation as being very
positive for the country. However, participants did not favor physical U.S. military presence
in Colombian territory—outside of trainers and equipment. Additionally, in some cases,
participants failed to accurately distinguish the U.S. military from other U.S. governmental
agencies. For example, some of the focus group participants blamed the 2012 Secret Service
controversy in Cartagena on the U.S. military.



Focus group participants in Barranquilla, Bogotá, and Cali stressed the need for greater
cooperation and exchanges with the U.S. in the areas of social, economic, and educational
development.



Focus group participants also believed that the country is better off with U.S. security and
economic assistance. Inversely, some respondents believed that the country will be worse off
if the U.S. is not heavily involved in the implementation of a peace plan. This largely stems
from low levels of trust in Colombian institutions combined with high trust in the U.S.
government and the U.S. military.



Results of the focus groups suggest that low levels of trust toward Colombian politicians arise
from high levels of impunity and pervasive socio-economic divisions throughout the country.
Perceptions of President Santos and former President Uribe varied based on regions; security
is the main factor shaping perceptions.



Participants in the focus groups had very low confidence in the police as they were perceived
as corrupt, and often, coercive with the population, particularly in Cúcuta and Pasto.
Conversely, high levels of trust in the Colombian military seem to be related to perceptions of
the military institutions as well-trained, professional, and far less corrupt than other Colombian
institutions.
3



Trust in China varied. Respondents who expressed low levels of trust highlight cultural
differences between Colombia and China. Participants overwhelmingly cited economic
engagement as the most common, and often only, element of Colombia-China relations. Focus
group members had low levels of trust in Russia as well, as Russia is not perceived as playing
a major role in Colombia. Participants had unfavorable views of Venezuela.



Participants in the focus groups expressed extremely low levels of trust in the FARC—in all
seven cities—and do not have favorable views of the peace negotiations with the FARC. Some
people in Colombia are concerned that the re-integration of the FARC into society will lead to
higher levels of violence in the country. In general, participants also believed that the U.S.
should play a major role in the implementation of the peace accord because Colombia will be
worse off without the support of the U.S.
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Introduction
Florida International University’s Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy (JGI) and Kimberly
Green Latin American and Caribbean Center (LACC) conducted a study to understand Colombian
perceptions towards internal and external actors and Colombia’s pursuit of peace. In order to pulse
the diversity of Colombian views, FIU partnered with a local public opinion firm, Centro Nacional
de Consultoría (CNC), to conduct focus groups in seven cities across Colombia between January
and March 2016. In total, FIU and CNC conducted 14 focus groups, two in each of the following
cities: Barranquilla, Bogotá, Cali, Cartagena, Cúcuta, Medellín, and Pasto. FIU’s research team
explored the following themes in each of the 14 focus groups:


United States foreign policy towards Colombia, the Barack Obama administration, and the
U.S. military.



Colombian institutions including political parties, the current Juan Manuel Santos
government, the former Álvaro Uribe government, the police, the armed forces, and the
media.



Extra-hemispheric actors such as China and Russia and hemispheric actors such as Cuba
and Venezuela.



The peace process and The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia—FARC).



The perceptions of Colombians five years ago, today, and five years from now. A
comparison between the state of Colombia in five years with and without U.S. aid.



Colombians’ perceptions with regard to what the role of the U.S. should be in Colombia.

The results of these focus groups reflect the opinions and perceptions of those who participated in
the study. Since this study only examined the views of approximately 150 Colombians, the results
do not reflect what Colombians in general think. Instead, the findings help to understand how some
Colombians view institutions and social issues in Colombia.

5

Background
Colombia is the oldest democracy in Latin America and has been a key ally of the U.S. for
decades. 1 Bilateral relations between Washington and Bogotá are very close and the U.S.
government continues to aid Colombia combating citizen insecurity and improving the rule of law.
From 2000 to 2015, the U.S. allocated more than $10 billion in assistance to the Colombian
government in an effort to combat violence, drug trafficking, and violent non-state actors.2
Military-to-military relations between the U.S. and Colombia have helped the Colombian military
improve its professionalism and institutional capacity, and focus group respondents recognized the
U.S.’s role in improving the Colombian military. Furthermore, support from the U.S. government
has enabled Colombia to increase the presence of the state throughout the country. Despite China
and Russia’s increased presence in the region, the U.S. continues to be Colombia’s main strategic
ally, as perceived by focus group respondents. The U.S. continues to play a key role in the
Colombian peace process and has pledged $450 million through the Paz Colombia initiative
launched in February 2016.
Colombia has made great strides in decreasing violence and promoting social and
economic stability; however, Colombia still faces major challenges as a result of weak institutions.
The lack of robust institutions, namely judicial, police, and social institutions, contribute to the
high levels of corruption, impunity, and socioeconomic inequality throughout the country. In spite
of reforms to the police, this institution struggles with high levels of corruption, as perceived by
Colombians. Over the past two decades, the Colombian government, with support of U.S. security
assistance, has been able to improve the levels of confidence that citizens have in the armed forces,
not only as a result of increases in security but also because of the improved perceptions of the
military. Furthermore, the improvements in citizen security in Colombia as a result of U.S. support
have made many Colombians reliant on Washington, not only with regard to security-related
issues, but also with improving the rule of law and strengthening institutions.

1

For more, see Russell Crandall, Driven by Drugs: US Policy Toward Colombia (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,
2008, second edition).
2
Ernesto Londoño, “Taking Stock of the $10 Billion Washington Spent on Colombia’s War,” The New York Times,
November 16, 2015.
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Existing Public Opinion Data
FIU’s research team analyzed existing public opinion data from Vanderbilt University’s Latin
American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), Gallup-Colombia, and Colombia’s Centro Nacional
de Consultoría (CNC). The data found in these surveys informed the line of questioning used by
FIU’s research team during the focus groups conducted earlier this year. The focus groups
conducted by FIU were instrumental in providing qualitative analysis into the considerations
shaping Colombians’ views. They also shed light on factors that inform positive or negative views
of the U.S. military. For more on the results of existing survey data, see Appendix I.

Research Methodology 3
FIU’s research team used the results of LAPOP’s 2014 study, as well as its desire to understand
the diversity of opinions, in order to determine the composition of the focus groups used in this
findings report. In order to mitigate response bias,4 FIU partnered with local public opinion firm
CNC to conduct focus groups in seven cities across Colombia between January and March 2016.
CNC was responsible for recruiting and interacting with all focus group participants before, during,
and after the focus groups. FIU’s research team, working through CNC, conducted 14 focus
groups, two in each of the following cities: Barranquilla, Bogotá, Cali, Cartagena, Cúcuta,
Medellín, and Pasto. FIU’s technical lead, Dr. Eduardo Gamarra, a native of Bolivia and career
pollster, facilitated 10 of the 14 focus groups. Colombian representatives from CNC facilitated
four of the 14 focus groups—two in Cúcuta and two in Pasto.

CITY

SAMPLE COMPOSITION
Group A: Professional and business sector; young women and men
between 23 and 45 years-old.

MEDELLÍN
Group B: Retired administrative workers women and men between
50 and 70 years-old.

3

United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) provided the financial resources to conduct the focus groups.
However, SOUTHCOM did not influence the study in any way; FIU maintained full academic integrity in the
design implementation, and authorship of the study.
4
Response bias refers to a wide range of cognitive biases that influence the responses of participants away from
accurate or truthful responses.
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Group A: Men without college education between 30 and 45 yearsold.
CALI
Group B: Housewives from marginal neighborhoods and slums
between 25 and 45 years-old.
Group A: Low income women and men without college education
between 40 and 56 years-old.
CÚCUTA
Group B: Low income young women and men between 25 and 35
years-old.
Group A: Women without college education between 30 and 45
years-old.
BARRANQUILLA
Group B: Housewives from marginal neighborhoods and slums
between 25 and 45 years-old.

Group A: Professional and business sector young women and men
between 23 and 35 years-old.
CARTAGENA
Group B: Men without college education between 30 and 45 yearsold.
Group A: Professionals and college students, men and women
between 18 and 25 years-old.
BOGOTÁ
Group B: Women without college education between 30 and 45
years-old.
Group A: Low income young men and women between 23 and 35
PASTO

years-old.
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Group B: Low income men and women between 40 and 60 yearsold.

Perceptions of the United States
The U.S. Government
Levels of trust in the U.S. government depend heavily on how Colombians perceive the
effects of U.S. policies in Colombia. Most participants across the seven cities recognized the
importance of the U.S. in terms of Colombia’s economic policies as well as the future of the
country. In addition, most members of the focus groups believed that the U.S. government has
played a major role in helping Colombia improve security in the country. In some cases,
participants viewed the U.S. as an example for Colombian institutions and society. People in
Medellín argued that Colombia’s proximity to the U.S. and its place in South America gives it
geostrategic importance to the U.S. This enables Colombia to receive benefits from its northern
neighbor and helps explain how the U.S. has taken advantage of the resources and opportunities
that Colombia has to offer. Some of the participants from the group of retired adults in Medellín
argued that countries do not have friends but rather interests when it comes to politics. During the
focus groups, one person talked about Colombia’s historic subordination to the U.S. and cited the
power and interests of the U.S. In particular, this individual referenced the Monroe Doctrine and
the Washington Consensus. Many participants did not trust the U.S. but cited the fact that there
are positive things such as academic exchanges and scholarships for education. Focus group
members also highlighted economic interests and the power of certain interest groups that control
political decisions within the U.S.
Some focus group respondents criticized the U.S. and expressed levels of distrust. Those
criticizing the U.S. cited historical experiences as influencing their distrust of the U.S. Members
from the group of adults in Pasto echoed the comments of some of the participants in Medellín and
highlighted the perception of U.S. intervention in the region throughout history. Despite suspicion,
young respondents in Pasto had very high levels of trust in the U.S. government. The key point is
that there is a generational gap that determines perceptions of trust. While historical legacies are
hard to overcome in older age groups, groups composed of younger people tended to have a more
favorable image of current U.S. policies toward Colombia.
9

Contrary to the perceptions of the groups in Medellín, cities such as Cali, Cartagena,
Barranquilla, Bogotá, and Cúcuta emphasized the positive aspects of the relationship between the
U.S. and Colombia. The overall perception was that the U.S. helped Colombia improve security
by combatting drug trafficking, guerilla groups, and improving the overall quality of life of
Colombians. Focus group respondents in Bogotá and Barranquilla, on average, had higher levels
of trust in the U.S. government than the other five cities. In Barranquilla, many participants argued
that the U.S. helped Colombia greatly and cited the role of the country in the peace process as an
example. Participants contended that some of the difficult times in Colombia have been a result of
the trade agreement between the two countries. In Bogotá, Medellín, and Cartagena, some people
argued that the U.S. is an example for Colombia in terms of education, the rule of law, and
institutions.
Various factors impact levels of trust in the U.S. government. The first is levels of
respondents’ education. Younger and less educated groups tended to express higher levels of trust
in the U.S. As a result of globalization and increased access to technology, less educated
individuals have access to information through various sources. Members of the focus groups often
had a positive perception of the U.S. as a result of the influence of soft power. Many respondents
in the focus groups credited U.S. movies and music as being influential to Colombians. Therefore,
the soft power of the U.S. may influence the perceptions of Colombians in a positive manner.
Despite some criticism, the U.S. is still viewed by some Colombians as the land of opportunity.
The focus group findings suggest that there are various engagement opportunities in which Bogotá
and Washington can cooperate. Open dialogue and learning from each government is key. It is
important to note that the groups from lower socio-economic backgrounds admitted that they did
not have extensive knowledge about the U.S., although they were able to express their views.

The Obama Administration
Participants of the focus groups had highly favorable views of Obama across all seven
cities, especially in the focus groups held in Barranquilla, Cali, and Medellín. People in Pasto and
Cúcuta also had very high perceptions of President Obama. Many participants from these cities
mentioned the fact that Obama is the first African-American to become president is a sign of
progress. They considered President Obama to be hard working, charismatic, and a strong ally for
Colombia, particularly since his administration has supported the peace process. One of the
10

respondents in Cartagena stated that he has more confidence in President Obama than former
President Bush because the latter was too focused on the Middle East. This perception is quite
interesting given the fact that the Bush administration provided more aid to Colombia than the
Obama administration.5 Also, in the group of adults in Cúcuta, there was strong support for
President George W. Bush, although they did not agree with the wars that he launched in
Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, respondents in Bogotá perceived President Obama to be
diplomatic and highlighted his positive initiatives and support of Colombia. Hence, Obama had
high favorability as a result of his personal image. It is important to stress that group members
from lower socio-economic backgrounds had less knowledge about Obama’s policies in Colombia.
Colombians from lower economic backgrounds in both Barranquilla and Bogotá stated that they
did not know much about Obama.
In addition to Obama’s personality, a key factor that likely impacted the high levels of trust
in Obama is the fact that he has traveled to the region. The physical presence of a sitting U.S.
president in one country results in massive media coverage, which in turn can make people believe
that the Obama administration is prioritizing Colombia and Latin America. Views of Obama
contributed to the level of favorability of the U.S. Some focus group members argued that the
November 2016 elections in the U.S. is a critical juncture for bilateral relations between Colombia
and the U.S. Focus group respondents, particularly those in Pasto and Cúcuta, believed that a
Donald Trump presidency could potentially harm bilateral relations and the reputation of the U.S.
in Colombia. Several individuals in Cúcuta, for example, highlighted how Trump has made
negative comments about Latinos.

The U.S. Military
Focus group respondents expressed very high levels of confidence in the U.S. military.
Participants routinely cited the U.S. training and professionalization efforts that are helping build
the institutional capacity of the Colombian military. In Pasto, young people expressed the highest
level of trust in the U.S. military of all the focus groups in Colombia. The results may imply that
young Colombians in close proximity to conflict have higher levels of trust in the U.S. military
than young people in the other major cities. Most focus group participants across all the focus

5

For more, see June S. Beittel, Colombia: Background, U.S. Relations, and Congressional Interest (Washington,
D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2012).
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groups noted that U.S.-Colombia military cooperation has resulted in increased levels of security
throughout Colombia. In addition, they consistently cited the U.S. military as a trustworthy and
professional institution and a role model for the Colombian military. Despite the positive views of
the U.S. military, participants stressed apprehension in a physical U.S. military presence in
Colombian territory, citing concerns over Colombian sovereignty. Participants viewed the idea of
U.S. military bases in Colombia very negatively. Instead, these respondents called for more
training and technical assistance to Colombian security forces.
However, there were some criticisms of the U.S. military, especially with respect to its
activities outside of Colombia. Groups from lower socio-economic backgrounds with limited
knowledge about the specific activities of the U.S. military in Colombia criticized the U.S. military
for alleged human rights violations—particularly during the Bush administration. National and
international media that covered U.S. military activities outside of Colombia informed much of
the participants’ criticisms towards the U.S. military. For example, human rights abuses that have
occurred in places like Guantanamo Bay appear to have impacted the perceptions of participants
about the U.S. military. Additionally, some participants failed to accurately distinguish between
U.S. governmental agencies. In Cartagena, some people highlighted the U.S. Secret Service
scandal, confusing the Secret Service with the military. Thus, the U.S.’s actions in Colombia,
especially the conduct of representatives of the U.S., can impact Colombians’ perceptions of the
U.S. In addition, the extensive media coverage of such events contributed to moral outrage in
Colombia. Conversely, there appears to be very little U.S. strategic communications efforts
influencing urban citizens from lower socio-economic households.

Perceptions of Colombian Institutions
In order to introduce the concept of trust among the groups in the different cities, the moderator
referenced the level of trust in Colombian institutions and identified five key categories: political
parties, the Colombian government—both the current and former governments (Santos and Uribe,
respectively)—, the police, the military, and the media. These categories serve as the entry points
for understanding the concept of trust used for this research study.

12

Political Parties and the Colombian Government
Focus group respondents were very critical of Colombian political parties. Many
respondents perceived an absence in political will among Colombian politicians, who they
believed, make numerous commitments during campaigns to get elected, but fail to deliver on most
of the promises made. It is important to emphasize that the majority of participants, with few
exceptions, referred to political parties as politicians in the most general sense of the word. Very
few respondents referred to the current status of political parties as a whole. In cities such as
Medellín and Bogotá, the participants argued that the Colombian people are ignorant about
politics. This suggests the lack of knowledge and voters’ unwillingness to inform themselves about
the candidates during elections, and their preference to receive money, food, and favors in
exchange for their votes. As stated in Bogotá, there is an association between corruption and
politics. Trust in local politicians is higher than the national government. According to the people
interviewed, while there are well intentioned politicians at the national level, the high levels of
corruption in the system prohibits these politicians from achieving what they set out to achieve
when elected. The level of trust in local politicians in Barranquilla and Medellín was largely
centered on the credibility of the mayor. Some people highlighted positive aspects of the
administrations of Alejandro Char in Barranquilla and Federico Gutierrez in Medellín, which
represented hope for the citizens. Regarding public security, the case of Alejandro Char’s policy
of militarization of the city was seen as a positive initiative by the two groups in Barranquilla.
Focus group respondents in Pasto and Cúcuta had very low confidence in politicians.
Participants in these regions cited similar reasons for high distrust, namely widespread corruption
and the unfulfilled promises. Across all focus groups, respondents stressed how politicians have
lost their identity.

The Executive Branch (President Santos vs President Uribe)
Levels of trust in the executive branch, specifically the current administration of Juan
Manuel Santos and the previous Uribe administration, change depending on the region where both
administrations have had greater influence. There are determinant factors that impact levels of trust
in the aforementioned presidencies. Security is the principal reason, but other important variables
include the economy, international relations, social issues, and institutional accountability. In the
case of the Santos government, cities such as Barranquilla and Cartagena, located in the north of
13

Colombia, have higher levels of trust in the current government. President Santos has focused on
providing people with housing during his second term. Such policies help explain why individuals
living in the coast have such high levels of trust in the current president. For example, some women
in a focus group of housewives from lower economic backgrounds viewed the current government
favorably since they received houses from it. Favorable policies for low income families was a
recurrent theme among such groups. In Cali, for example, one person argued that if she is doing
well, then her perception of the Santos government is favorable. This is an important point because
these women were from marginalized communities and like many people judge the presidents and
governments depending on how well they are doing. Simultaneously, many members of the group
had limited knowledge of politics, but they talked about both the positive and negative things that
have happened in the government overtime.
Therefore, the persistent underlying factors that mark distrust in the government
highlighted by Colombian participants were: First, the concern about the economic performance
of the country. This was one of the most frequent topics that generated discussion when evaluating
the Santos administration. Participants emphasized that the country is currently experiencing low
economic performance; some participants in Barranquilla stressed the lack of employment and
difficult economic conditions. One of the most controversial themes in cities like Medellín,
Bogotá, and Cúcuta was the recent selling of Electric Generation and Interconnection Society
(Sociedad de Interconexión y Generación Eléctrica—ISAGEN). This topic was especially
contentious among groups that consisted of young people working in the business sector. Second,
participants focused on security and its relationship to the peace process. Several respondents were
uncertain about the future of stability in Colombia as the peace process moves forward.
Two individuals in Cartagena argued that they do not trust Santos as they voted for him
under the impression that he would continue Uribe’s security policies. This is a recurrent trend and
helps explain the low levels of trust in President Santos. One individual felt that Santos abandoned
Uribe’s tough stance against the FARC only to pursue a peace process destined for failure. As a
result, this person lost his trust in President Santos. Focus group results in Cúcuta and Pasto had
low levels of confidence in the Santos administration. Some people in both Pasto and Cúcuta
viewed Santos as untrustworthy because he betrayed Uribe once he was elected into office. In the
group of adults in Cúcuta, one individual believed that plomo (lead) is the best option since there
is no peace anywhere. Such statements imply that the Colombian government should have
14

continued the offensive against the FARC as opposed to negotiating with them. People in Cúcuta
felt that Santos lacks character and thought that insecurity has increased during the Santos
administration. The adults in Pasto believed that there is a social crisis in the region since there are
no jobs in the city. In sum, lack of employment opportunities, Santos’s security strategy, and the
negotiations with the FARC contributed to increasing levels of distrust in President Santos in Pasto
and Cúcuta. In Medellín, participants did not trust the Santos government mainly because of
economic reasons.
In four of the seven major cities, Bogotá, Cali, Cartagena, and Pasto, focus group
participants highlighted problems with policies designed to address various social issues. While
focus group members who have received benefits from the government such as housing had a
positive view of the administration, others focused on social issues and challenges like poverty,
child care, healthcare, “Families in Action” (Familias en Acción), and various other issues. Finally,
institutional accountability was a recurrent concern among participants across all cities. A high
number of people interviewed emphasized the inconformity about some decisions of the
government related to political appointments (some participants highlighted the “Mermelada,”
which is a colloquial term for clientelistic practices among the government). Some people in the
focus groups questioned the criteria of the government in choosing ministers. In Bogotá, for
example, one person asserted that the Minister of Health, an engineer, is not suited for this job.
The logic is that this professional background does not make the minister competent for this
position.
Álvaro Uribe’s administration had mixed results across the different cities. One of the
major themes was the importance of security and its relationship to the Uribe administration.
People in the focus groups highlighted the differences between the current and former
administrations, especially in Cartagena and Cali, where Uribe had higher favorability. In a focus
group held in Cartagena with non-college educated men between 30 and 45 years-old, one member
of the group with high trust in Uribe emphasized improvements in security during the Uribe
government. Some people explained how the country improved a great deal during the Uribe
administration and expressed concerns about growing levels of insecurity. Inversely, participants
in Barranquilla and Bogotá had low levels of trust in the Uribe administration. For example, in
Barranquilla, various individuals argued that Uribe changed many things in a bad way.

15

Throughout the focus groups, there were slight differences in the views held by residents
of the more rural communities of Cúcuta and Pasto and the major five cities of Barranquilla,
Bogotá, Cali, Cartagena, and Medellín, particularly with respect to perceptions of the Colombian
government. Respondents in Cúcuta and Pasto showed higher confidence in Álvaro Uribe’s
government than respondents in the five major cities. Participants in Cúcuta and Pasto felt that
Uribe’s government provided citizens with greater levels of security than the Santos
administration. Nevertheless, one person in the group of adults in Cúcuta stressed that Uribe’s
fights with Hugo Chávez caused more problems for the people living in Cúcuta. In addition, one
individual in the group of adults in Pasto did not trust Uribe because this person was a victim of
the paramilitaries. Furthermore, some people supported the Santos administration’s departure from
Uribe’s plan of action for security in Colombia. In sum, the results suggest that security in
Colombia is the main concern and directly impacts levels of trust in the current and former
administrations, as well as attitudes towards the peace process. The character, charisma, and
policies of each president were defined by respondents mostly in terms of past, current, and future
levels of security in the country.

Media in Colombia
The media is among the lowest institutions in terms of levels of trust among the focus group
members. Many participants argued that powerful interest groups seek economic and political
benefits through the control and manipulation of media sources. Hence, the majority of people had
negative perceptions of the media. It is important to highlight that many individuals preferred to
obtain their news from printed newspapers, radio, and television, due to easy access and low cost.
Accessibility to social media, the Internet, and alternative sources had higher levels of popularity
among cities such as Medellín, Bogotá, and Cartagena, where the group composition included
young people and professionals in the business sector whose level of income were significantly
higher than other groups. Such results imply that the perceived power of elites, politicians, and the
media is a major concern among many Colombians. Finally, the groups in Pasto and Cúcuta also
had very little trust in the media. Local newspapers that are low cost were the main sources of
news in these two cities. Respondents in these cities believed that the media is controlled by
powerful people in Bogotá who manipulate information. The fact that the major national media
outlets are centralized in the capital city is another possible explanation for why people did not
16

trust the media. The national media does not often cover news stories outside of Bogotá. This
suggests that people are very interested in knowing what is happening locally because such events
impact their daily lives. Channels that cover local events often have less resources than major
media outlets. However, these stations were preferred and viewed favorably among people living
in these regions.

The Colombian National Police
The police represent one of the most controversial topics in terms of trust in Colombian
institutions. In general, the police were perceived by the focus group participants as very
untrustworthy. Corruption among police, lack of professionalization and education of the officers,
police abuse against citizens, and the mismanagement of the institution represent the main themes
across the cities included in the study. Corruption within the police forces was the most recurrent
theme across all cities. Some people in the focus groups argued that police officers are always
looking to prey on Colombians as a means of supplementing their income. They asserted that
corruption levels are very high in the institution and begins with the high ranking officials and
continues down to the low-ranking officers. The low levels of trust are based on personal
experiences and encounters with the police, where people repeatedly attested to having to bribe
police officers. Also, respondents highlighted cases of police force involvement in illicit activities.
The lack of professionalization of the police was believed to be one of the underlying causes for
police abuse and corruption. They compared the level of professionalization of this institution to
that of the military.
Focus group participants expressed significantly more trust in the military than in the
police. Respondents in Cali and Barranquilla suggested replacing the police with the military. They
felt that the education and instruction that the police receive is very deficient and causes some
members to lack the sense of belonging to the institution as well as the patriotic duty and
conviction. Many respondents argued that they have been traumatized by the police. Specifically,
the officers caused many people to be fearful of the police, which in turn impacts levels of trust.
One person in the group of adults in Cúcuta was more scared of the police than the guerrillas in
Colombia. One member of the focus group believed that they should kill the police, revealing the
level of distain and lack of trust that some Colombians have in the institution. Some young
individuals in Cúcuta thought that there are differences between policemen and policewomen and
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that women were perceived to be more professional and less corrupt. Respondents in Pasto asserted
that the police today are young people who are more interested in women and cellphones,
demonstrating the lack of trust in the institution.
However, some participants emphasized that not all police officers are bad. Respondents
in Bogotá had higher levels of trust in the police and some participants argued that the presence of
police officers makes them feel more secure, especially in public places. Other individuals admired
the police in the U.S. and viewed them as a model for the Colombian institution. Overall, the
findings suggest that further reforms to the police are required.

The Colombian Armed Forces
In contrast to the case of the police, focus group participants expressed high levels of
respect for the military because the perception was that the institution has higher levels of
professionalism, education, and accountability. In addition, they thought that the military has
helped increase security in the country. People had higher levels of empathy for the military
because of the sacrifices of the soldiers as well as their patriotism. Respondents in cities such as
Cali, Bogotá, and Barranquilla noted that the soldiers are better educated and have higher technical
capacities. In addition, respondents perceived the soldiers as having more authority and being more
committed to maintaining security within the country. Families who had close ties with the military
had more empathy for the institution. Media coverage of successful military operations helped
increase perceptions of the military. This suggests that the media plays a fundamental role and can
positively or negatively impact perceptions of the institutions. Although people interviewed for
this study respected the military, it appears that people from lower socio-economic backgrounds
in Cartagena and Barranquilla had limited interaction with the military. This could explain why
these individuals have significantly higher opinions of the military.
While participants in the focus groups highlighted the high degree of professionalism of
the military, some people emphasized human rights abuses, specifically the False Positives
scandal. 6 Despite such criticism, the high levels of empathy for the military may help explain why
many respondents had such high levels of trust. Yet people in Medellín have a different perspective
with regard to the military. While young professionals working in the business sector had high

“Colombia: Top Brass Linked to Extrajudicial Executions,” Human Rights Watch, June 24, 2015,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/24/colombia-top-brass-linked-extrajudicial-executions, accessed April 2016.
6
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opinions of the military, they highlighted institutional conflicts between the military and the police.
The second group, retired adults between 50 and 70 years-old, had very negative images of the
military. One participant had less confidence in the armed forces and argued that they make him
nervous. Other individuals declared that the army needs wars to occur as they benefit from conflict.
This notion represents a very common point of discussion, and people stressed the military’s
interests and the need to sustain the war. However, some individuals preferred the military more
than the police. The generational differences are likely the reason for such feelings as well as the
fact that these individuals have lived through many years of Colombian history, some of which
have been characterized by extreme levels of violence.

Extra-Hemispheric Actors: China and Russia
China
Colombians who participated in the focus groups had low levels of trust in China. Many
people in the focus groups mentioned China and its cheap goods as well as the hard work and
discipline of the Chinese. This suggests that the Colombians have a positive image of the Chinese
people for their work ethic. The idea is that such high levels of discipline are required for increasing
a country’s level of development. In Cúcuta, people stressed China’s relationship with Venezuela.
Several Colombians across the cities cited the cultural differences between Colombia and China.
In addition, some respondents believed that China’s economic growth and export practices have
either negatively or positively impacted the Colombian economy. Despite China’s technical and
economic development, most participants across the cities underscored the necessity for Colombia
to be close allies with the U.S. In sum, perceptions of trust in China are defined through an
economic lens. The cultural differences between China and Colombia represent barriers to
cooperation. In spite of various differences, the U.S. and Colombia have more in common in terms
of culture, which can help promote strategic cooperation.

Russia
When asked about Russia, participants had low levels of trust. In general terms, many
people did not perceive Colombia and Russia as having a close relationship or high levels of
interactions. Many respondents argued that Russia has helped left-wing governments in Latin
America, such as Venezuela, but the country does not have a direct relationship with Colombia.
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Some people viewed Russia as undemocratic. Trust in Russia among focus group participants in
Pasto and Cúcuta remained quite low. One individual in Cúcuta argued that trusting Russia is like
trusting President Maduro of Venezuela, implying that Russia is not trustworthy. In addition, one
person in Pasto contended that Vladimir Putin is crazy. Overall, people across the seven cities had
limited knowledge about Russia and did not consider the country to be a major player in Colombia.
However, the focus group members had more knowledge about Russia in Pasto and Cúcuta.

Hemispheric Actors: Venezuela and Cuba
Venezuela
Colombians’ perceptions of Venezuela are defined by historic episodes that have impacted
bilateral relations between Venezuela and Colombia, especially on the border. Despite low levels
of trust in the Venezuelan government, many of the participants manifested trust in the Venezuelan
people. Some of them highlighted the lack of trust in the Nicolás Maduro government, citing the
various border disputes between the two countries. In Bogotá, some respondents argued that
Venezuela should not play a role in the peace process and did not perceive this country to be a key
player in Colombian affairs. However, people living in Cúcuta have more interactions with
Venezuela given the geographic location of the city. In addition, some individuals have family
members living in Venezuela. The fact that some of these people have documents from Venezuela
could impact their perceptions of the country. Political tensions between the Colombian and
Venezuelan governments directly impact the people living in Cúcuta, which in turn can alter their
perceptions. The results suggest that tensions and distrust between Colombians and Venezuelans
will continue to be present for the foreseeable future and will hinder bilateral relations. In sum,
perceptions of respondents in Cúcuta and Pasto appeared to be formed by everyday interactions
with border countries, namely Venezuela and Ecuador, while respondents in the five major cities
form their opinions based on media and other sources of information.

Cuba
Colombians who participated in the study have mixed levels of trust in Cuba. Many people
highlighted Cuba’s role in the peace process, viewing this is a negative because of the relationship
between the Cuban government and the FARC. In Bogotá, one person compared Cuba to the
FARC, highlighting the political affinities for communism of both actors. Yet some people in cities
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such as Cartagena admired Cuba because of the medicine and personal experiences, such as
relatives that went to Cuba to study medicine. Such examples demonstrate how personal
experiences can impact the perceptions of people. Colombians in other cities such as Bogotá and
Barranquilla considered Cuba to be a neutral actor in Colombian affairs. Some individuals in Pasto
and Cúcuta highlighted the Obama administration’s rapprochement with Cuba but argued that
things will change only when the Castro brothers die. The younger group in Pasto had higher levels
of confidence in Cuba than the other cities. On the other hand, participants of the groups in Cúcuta
had very low levels of trust in Cuba.

The Peace Process and the FARC
The FARC
In general, the findings suggest that focus group participants had very low levels of trust
in the FARC. Most individuals highlighted the negative connotations and hostility toward the
FARC that is present throughout the country. Negative perceptions of the FARC existed for several
reasons. First, the FARC’s violations of human rights and involvement in criminal activities such
as kidnapping, extortion, drug trafficking, and massacres. One individual in Cúcuta argued that the
FARC is a mafia and highlighted the organizations illegal business activities. People in the focus
groups in Cúcuta claimed that the FARC used to have an ideology but turned into a mafia-like
organization. Second, the lack of credibility of the FARC has increased overtime because of the
lack of commitment of the guerrillas in several peace process efforts. In addition, respondents did
not believe that the FARC will demobilize. Finally, the participants considered the FARC to be a
major threat to security. Many people in the study had serious concerns about the FARC and the
future of the peace process. The majority of focus group members believed that the demobilization
of the FARC as a result of the peace process will fail. Participants also doubted that the FARC will
be able to reintegrate into society, which could cause members to return to criminal activities.
Overall, a general sense of uncertainty existed among respondents about the reintegration of the
FARC into society.

The Peace Process
Focus groups in all of the cities had low levels of trust in the current peace negotiations.
The lowest level of trust in the peace process was in the group of adults in Cúcuta. However, the
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participants hoped that a peace accord will be signed as they believe that peace would benefit the
country. Many people expressed high levels of skepticism regarding the demobilization process,
the implementation of the agreement, the high economic and political costs of implementation,
and the future of security within the country. Respondents across the seven cities were concerned
about insecurity and the fact that the FARC will not be punished for many of the crimes that they
have committed. Participants in Cali felt that the peace process does not solve anything if the other
guerrilla organization, the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional—ELN), is
not included in the negotiations. Other individuals expressed concerns about the hidden interests
of the government with regard to the negotiating agenda. All of the participants in one group in
Cartagena argued that they will vote against the referendum.
Many people in the focus groups stress the important role that the U.S. plays in the peace
process. They considered the U.S. to be trustworthy as a guarantor of the implementation of the
peace process. Some individuals in Pasto and Cúcuta argued that the U.S. could be the overseer of
the peace process and the “economic godfather.” In Bogotá, some respondents thought that the
U.S. should play a role in the post-conflict phase. In particular, the U.S. could assist with social,
economic, and educational support as well as continued support for the armed forces.

Conclusion
The focus groups had some common themes. The focus group members were very critical of
Colombian politicians. Colombians have very little trust in politicians as they argue that politicians
look out for their own interests. Colombians are also very critical of other institutions, particularly
the police forces in Colombia. The members had little trust in the police and talked about
corruption and lack of training. People have daily interactions with the police and have had many
negative experiences, such as officers looking for bribes, which can influence levels of trust in the
police. The results suggest further reforms of the police are needed. On the other hand, respondents
had higher levels of trust in the Colombian military as this institution was seen as more professional
and better trained than the police. People likely have more confidence in the armed forces because
they do not interact with them.
While there is some criticism of the U.S., participants have very high opinions of President
Obama. The fact that Obama is an African-American represented a sign of hope for Colombians.
In addition, many individuals had high levels of trust in the U.S. government. Many Colombians
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trust the U.S. Armed Forces. Many people argue that the U.S. Armed Forces have supported
Colombia in a positive manner. The perception is that the U.S. Armed Forces are very professional
and should continue to help train the Colombian Armed Forces. This is an area for strategic
engagement between the U.S. and Colombia.
Colombians also have very negative perceptions of the peace process. Numerous
respondents argued that it is not fair that the Colombian government is going to pay the former
members of the FARC when so many people are suffering in the country. A major concern is that
violence will increase in the cities as the FARC members reintegrate into society. Many
participants contended that the U.S. should continue to support the Colombian government,
particularly with regard to the peace process. They think that progress in Colombia will be greater
with more support. The results suggest participants are expecting financial support from the U.S.
government and believe that the U.S. will be the key to the implementation of the peace process.
The U.S. has pledged $450 million toward Colombia under the Paz Colombia initiative,7 yet the
peace process is estimated to cost $44 billion over the next 10 years.8 Overall, the perception was
that the U.S. government should continue to help the Colombian government but the Colombians
do not want the U.S. military in Colombia. Finally, numerous respondents recommended that the
next president of the U.S. address issues of education and health as well as economic support. The
presidential elections in the U.S. will likely have a major impact on perceptions and levels of trust.
Colombians appear to be very concerned about a Trump presidency as he has made various
derogatory comments regarding Latinos.

Roberta Rampton, “Obama pledges more than $450 million aid to help Colombia peace plan,” Reuters, February 5,
2016.
8
“Peace will cost Colombia $44 billion over 10 years, senator says,” Reuters, October 8, 2014.
7
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Appendix I
AmericasBarometer Data
Despite the high levels of cooperation between the U.S. and Colombian governments, according
to Vanderbilt University’s AmericasBarometer trust (confianza in Spanish) in the U.S. Armed
Forces by Colombians decreased from 45.5 in 2012 to 39.02 in 2014 on a scale from 0 to 100. 9
Colombian trust in the U.S. military is low, especially compared across Latin America and the
Caribbean. What are the factors associated with trust in the U.S. military? To determine the
demographic and substantive variables behind the Colombian citizens’ trust in the armed forces,
we ran an ordinary least square (OLS) regression using the data of Vanderbilt University’s 2014
AmericasBarometer in Colombia.10 The results show that young Colombians tend to have higher
confidence in the American military than the rest of the population, holding all variables constant.
By the same token, trust in the U.S. military is higher among the residents of urban areas than
residents of rural zones in Colombia, whereas people with higher family incomes tend to have
greater levels of trust in the U.S. military than the rest of the population. According to the data, the
higher the income the more confidence in the American Armed Forces.

Table 13. Determinants of Trust in the U.S. Military
Variables

Coeff.

Linearized
SE

Female

-2.013

1.76

Age

-0.1362*

0.065

Years of Education

-0.2231

0.280

Urban

6.689*

2.68

Family Income

0.538*

0.227

Left-of-center ideology

-7.809*

2.29

Right-of-center-ideology

4.638*

2.02

0.3735**

0.051

Support for System

9

Maria Fernanda Boidi, Attitudes Towards the U.S. Military in the Americas (Miami, Florida: Florida International
University, 2015); June S. Beittel, Colombia: Background, U.S. Relations, and Congressional Interest (Washington,
D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2012); Connie Veillette, Plan Colombia: A Progress Report (Washington,
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accessed March 2016.
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Military should combat crime

2.031**

0.53

Constant

23.41*

6.95

N

1,227

R-squared

0.12

*p<0.05; **p<0.001

However, the most important variables predicting trust in the U.S. military are political.
People who self-identify as left-of-center show lower levels of trust than any other political group
in Colombia. On the contrary, individuals who self-identify as ideologically right-of-center
indicate higher levels of trust in the American military than any other ideology-based group in
Colombia. Furthermore, Colombians who have high levels of support for the political system and
who believe that the military should participate in the fight against crime tend to express high
levels of trust in the U.S. military, ceteris paribus. In other words, young people, urban dwellers,
people with higher income, people who self-identify with right-of-center ideology, and
Colombians who have an important degree of trust in the political system tend to trust the U.S.
military more than any other population group in this country. Other variables, such as gender,
education, and personal history of having been directly affected by the conflict or victimized by
crime (not shown in the regression table), did not have statistically-significant results and do not
seem to predict levels of trust in the U.S. military.
In addition, a comparison in the levels of trust in the U.S. by region shows that residents
of the city of Bogotá have the lowest degree of confidence in comparison with other regions. In
this area, the average trust in the American Armed Forces was 32.4, whereas the national average
is 39.1, according to the AmericasBarometer data. In contrast, residents of the Atlantic region show
the highest levels of trust in the U.S. military with an average score of 46. In the rest of the country,
trust in the military roughly approached the national average.

Gallup Polling Data
In a February 2016 Gallup poll, 79 percent of Colombians believed that insecurity was worsening,
while only 14 percent thought that the situation was improving. Regarding the guerillas, 61 percent
believed that the situation in Colombia was worsening while 21 percent believed that it was
improving. The poll also reveals that Colombian’s think that corruption is getting worse as only 7
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percent of the people surveyed thought that corruption was improving while 84 percent felt that
corruption was worsening. 11
In addition, 54 percent of Colombians had a favorable view of Álvaro Uribe, yet 37 percent
had an unfavorable view. The population also had a very favorable opinion of the military as only
32 percent had an unfavorable view while 66 percent had a favorable opinion. In addition, the
majority of Colombians (57 percent) had a favorable view of the media, while 40 percent had an
unfavorable view. The populace had less favorable opinions of various other institutions in the
country. For example, Colombians had lower opinions of the police as 59 percent had an
unfavorable view and 38 percent had a favorable view. People in the country also had a low opinion
of political parties as 76 percent had an unfavorable view yet only 16 percent had a favorable view.
Finally, only 20 percent of the population had a favorable view of the Colombian Congress while
71 percent had an unfavorable view.12

CNC Polling Data
The Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC) conducted polls and found that 59 percent of
Colombian’s had a positive image of President Santos in November 2015. Consequently, such a
positive image experienced a decrease when in March 2016, 34 percent of Colombian’s had a
positive image of President Santos while 62 percent had a negative view of him. The Atlantic
Region had the highest regard for President Santos as 49 percent of Colombians in this region had
a positive image of the president. However, individuals in other regions in Colombia had a lower
opinion of Santos: 30 percent in the Oriental Region; 27 percent in the Central Region; and 26
percent in Bogotá. CNC found that 45 percent of Colombians in March 2016 did not approve of
the Santos administration’s decision to conduct peace talks with the guerrillas while 53 percent
approved. The Atlantic Region had the highest approval rating for Santos’ decisions to begin the
peace dialogues with the guerrillas as 66 percent of the people in this region approved. Bogotá and
the Central Region had the lowest percentage of people agreeing with this decision as only 48
percent agreed with this decision in each region. Yet 63 percent of the individuals in the Oriental

See Gallup Poll, “111 Colombia Febrero 2016,” El país, http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/graficos/conozcaresultados-ultima-encuesta-gallup, accessed March 2016.
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Region felt optimistic regarding the peace talks compared to 52 percent in the Atlantic Region, 43
percent in Bogotá, 39 percent in the Pacific Region, and 36 percent in the Central Region. 13

13

Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC), Zoom, CNC Opinión Pública: Marzo 2016 (Bogotá, Colombia: CNC,
2016).
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